Crypto hacks 2026, read by Crypfy

$8.8bn in ten months.

47 thefts above $5 million, from exchanges to DeFi protocols, bridges and hardware wallets. For each one: what happened, the control that would have stopped it and the sources. Updated 6 November 2026.

$8.8bnstolen from 1 January to 6 November 2026
47cases above $5 million
87%of the value starts from people, access and keys
23 of 47cases with no code bug at the origin

One case dominates the figure: Binance, $6.3 billion in one evening, without a single key being stolen. Without Binance, $2.5 billion remain across 46 cases.

All the cases

Every 2026 theft above $5 million, with sources.

Filter by type of victim or by entry point, sort by amount or by date. Open a case to read what happened, the control that stops it and the sources.

Victim
Entry

47 cases, $8.8bn

Binance29 October 2026
Amount$6.3bn
Exchanges and custodiansPeople, access and keysReference case

What happened

Fake job interview, malware on a development PC, an internal AI tool with too many permissions, a deploy token: the internal signing service signs 50 EIP-7702 delegations and in 3 minutes 24 seconds the hot wallet is empty. No private key stolen. About $2.85 billion frozen or intercepted, loss covered by Binance from its own funds.

The control that stops it

A signing system that never signs delegations, expiring critical access, simulation before signing.

Networks: Ethereum, Bitcoin, TRON and other networksDate: 29 October 2026
Bitget24 September 2026
Amount$387.5m
Exchanges and custodiansPeople, access and keysReference case

What happened

Zero-day in a third-party security product, high-privilege internal credentials stolen, 24 days of presence in the systems. Two test transfers below the threshold, then 17 large transfers: real-time reconciliation sees the anomaly after 34 minutes. About $388 million from 12 hot and warm addresses, user balances covered by the protection fund.

The control that stops it

Risk check at the signing layer, balance caps on hot wallets, reconciliation that also blocks internal transfers.

Networks: 11 chains, including Ethereum, TRON, XRP and ZcashDate: 24 September 2026
Liquid Network6 September 2026
Amount$318.7m
Bridges and chainsCode and bridge bugsReference case

What happened

A vulnerability in the Elements software, in the cache of range proof verifications, allows unbacked L-BTC to be created and about 4,000 BTC to be redeemed from the reserves. After the patch the attackers return 3,400 BTC; Blockstream refuses the ransom asked for the last 600 and restores the 1:1 backing of L-BTC.

The control that stops it

Real-time monitoring of reserve backing and per-block limits on peg-outs.

Networks: Liquid, Bitcoin sidechainDate: 6 September 2026
Kelp DAO (rsETH)18 April 2026
Amount$291.3m
DeFi protocolsCode and bridge bugsReference case

What happened

A cross-chain message that never existed is accepted by the bridge: according to the LayerZero report the attackers compromised the RPC nodes used by the verification path. Unbacked rsETH ends up as collateral in lending markets and the hole spreads across more than twenty chains. The largest DeFi theft of 2026.

The control that stops it

Independent verification of cross-chain messages with several verifiers and caps on bridge volumes.

Networks: Ethereum and Arbitrum, LayerZero bridgeDate: 18 April 2026
Drift Protocol1 April 2026
Amount$285.3m
DeFi protocolsPeople, access and keysReference case

What happened

No code bug. The Security Council was a 2-of-5 multisig: two approvals obtained by deception and pre-signed with durable nonces, timelock removed five days earlier. On 1 April two pre-signed transactions hand over the admin permissions and the vaults are drained in 31 withdrawals in about 12 minutes. Several analysts attribute the attack to North Korean groups.

The control that stops it

Timelock on every permission change, a threshold higher than 2 of 5, monitoring of nonces and pre-signed transactions.

Networks: SolanaDate: 1 April 2026
Theft from a single investormade public on 16 January 2026
Amount~$284m
Wallets and individualsPeople, access and keys

What happened

A single investor loses about $282 million in bitcoin and litecoin after a social engineering attack built around the support for his hardware wallet. The largest theft from a private individual in 2026. The funds are quickly moved to mixers and cross-chain swaps. CertiK counts about $284 million.

The control that stops it

No support desk ever asks for the seed phrase: out-of-band verification and multi-signature custody for large holdings.

Networks: Bitcoin and LitecoinDate: made public on 16 January 2026
Tectonic30 August 2026
Amount$120.4m
DeFi protocolsCode and bridge bugs

What happened

Direct transfers to the markets inflate the exchange rate and the internal prices of the lending protocol: with inflated collateral the attacker borrows over $120 million. Cronos halts the chain and rolls back 10,961 blocks: $111 million erased, about $9.2 million not recovered.

The control that stops it

Borrow caps per market and checks on anomalous exchange-rate changes.

Networks: CronosDate: 30 August 2026
Coldcard31 July 2026
Amount$116m
Wallets and individualsCode and bridge bugs

What happened

A firmware bug reduces the entropy of seed generation on a series of devices: keys become guessable offline and wallets are drained. About $116 million in bitcoin, the largest hardware wallet case of 2026.

The control that stops it

Seeds generated from several verifiable entropy sources; firmware updates treated as a risk control.

Networks: BitcoinDate: 31 July 2026
Ledger / CryptoBilis9 October 2026
Amount$102m
Wallets and individualsPeople, access and keys

What happened

Ledger devices sold by a third-party reseller with a hidden hardware implant that transmitted recovery phrases over the mobile network. Ledger confirms the implant in at least one device; on-chain reconstructions count over 300 wallets drained, from $93 to $102 million.

The control that stops it

Devices only from the manufacturer or verified channels and an integrity check at first boot.

Networks: Bitcoin, Ethereum and other networksDate: 9 October 2026
Nesa24 August 2026
Amount$50m nominal
Bridges and chainsCode and bridge bugs

What happened

A balance underflow in the Cosmos EVM module allows victims’ balances to be redirected: NES tokens worth a nominal $50 million are minted, but slippage leaves the attacker about $60,000. The same flaw hits KiiChain, TAC and MANTRA.

The control that stops it

Audits of modules shared across chains and limits on out-of-the-ordinary issuance.

Networks: Nesa (Cosmos EVM)Date: 24 August 2026
Step Finance31 January 2026
Amount$40m
DeFi protocolsPeople, access and keys

What happened

Compromised executive devices expose the signing credentials of the treasury and fee wallets. The project loses about $40 million and shuts down, together with SolanaFloor and Remora Markets.

The control that stops it

Treasury keys on dedicated devices, multiple signatures, no keys on work PCs.

Networks: SolanaDate: 31 January 2026
Mercado Bitcoin2 November 2026
Amount~$40m
Exchanges and custodiansPeople, access and keysAdded by Crypfy

What happened

Brazil’s largest exchange suffers unauthorised withdrawals of about $40 million across ten chains from a compromised system, suspends withdrawals and says it will cover all customer losses.

The control that stops it

Balance caps on hot wallets per chain and real-time reconciliation.

Networks: 10 chains, including Bitcoin, Ethereum and SolanaDate: 2 November 2026
Humanity Protocol8 June 2026
Amountover $32m
DeFi protocolsPeople, access and keys

What happened

A foundation member’s key is compromised and the admin wallets are drained for over $32 million. The H token loses about 89% within hours.

The control that stops it

Admin wallets on a multisig with timelock, no single key with spending power.

Networks: Ethereum and BSCDate: 8 June 2026
Truebit8 January 2026
Amount$26.4m
DeFi protocolsCode and bridge bugs

What happened

An integer overflow in the purchase logic of a 2021 contract allows TRU tokens to be minted almost for free and the ETH reserve to be drained. Abandoned code, still holding funds.

The control that stops it

Retirement or freezing of legacy contracts that still hold value.

Networks: EthereumDate: 8 January 2026
Resolv Labs (USR)21 March 2026
Amount$25m
DeFi protocolsPeople, access and keys

What happened

A service key hosted on AWS KMS is compromised: 80 million unbacked USR are minted and converted into about $25 million in ETH before the blocks. The stablecoin loses its peg for days.

The control that stops it

Minting keys behind several approvals and per-block issuance limits.

Networks: EthereumDate: 21 March 2026
AFX Trade (bridge)22 July 2026
Amount$24.15m
DeFi protocolsPeople, access and keys

What happened

The attacker obtains 5 of the 7 validator keys of the perp DEX bridge and passes the multisig threshold: about $24 million in USDC. The team publicly offers a 30% bounty for the return.

The control that stops it

Validator keys on separate infrastructure, rotation and monitoring of signatures.

Networks: ArbitrumDate: 22 July 2026
Ostium15 July 2026
Amount$23.75m
DeFi protocolsPeople, access and keys

What happened

The off-chain oracle key is compromised: signed fake prices open and close positions at a loss for the protocol. About $23.75 million in five minutes. The Arbitrum bridge was not breached.

The control that stops it

Oracles with several signers and plausibility checks on prices before execution.

Networks: ArbitrumDate: 15 July 2026
BonkDAO6 July 2026
Amount$20m
DeFi protocolsGovernance

What happened

With about $4 million the attacker buys enough BONK to control 99.88% of the votes and passes a proposal that transfers $20 million from the treasury. No bug: governance worked as written.

The control that stops it

Quorum and timelock on spending proposals, council veto, time-weighted voting.

Networks: SolanaDate: 6 July 2026
Rhea Finance16 April 2026
Amount$18.4m
DeFi protocolsCode and bridge bugs

What happened

Chained swaps through attacker-created pools defeat the slippage protection and drain the lending protocol’s reserves. The team’s report puts the loss at $18.4 million, more than double the first estimates.

The control that stops it

Allow-list of pools used in swap routes and per-transaction limits.

Networks: NearDate: 16 April 2026
CoinDCX21 October 2026
Amount$16m
Exchanges and custodiansPeople, access and keys

What happened

Outflows of about $16 million from addresses compromised in the 2025 breach and still active for deposits. The exchange first calls it a false alarm, then confirms the loss.

The control that stops it

Permanent retirement of compromised addresses and continuous reconciliation of deposits on legacy wallets.

Networks: TRONDate: 21 October 2026
Superfortune AI (GUA)27 May 2026
Amount$15.2m
DeFi protocolsPeople, access and keys

What happened

Address poisoning on a multisig transaction: a near-identical address replaces the unlock recipient and $15 million in GUA goes to the attacker, who sells immediately.

The control that stops it

Verification of the full address on an independent channel and an allow-list of recipients in the multisig.

Networks: EthereumDate: 27 May 2026
79th Vault (79AU)7 October 2026
Amount$14.35m
DeFi protocolsPeople, access and keys

What happened

A compromised operator key gives access to a privileged token function: the PancakeSwap pool liquidity is drained despite the liquidity lock. Estimates from $12.5 to $14.35 million.

The control that stops it

Privileged functions behind a multisig and timelock, no single operator key.

Networks: BNB ChainDate: 7 October 2026
Grinex16 April 2026
Amount$13.7m
Exchanges and custodiansPeople, access and keysAdded by Crypfy

What happened

The hot wallets of the sanctioned Russian exchange, successor of Garantex, are drained for about $13.7 million; the funds are swapped at once to avoid stablecoin freezes. Operations suspended.

The control that stops it

Hot wallets with minimal balances and multi-approval signing; for those receiving the funds, counterparty screening.

Networks: TRON and EthereumDate: 16 April 2026
Matcha / SwapNet25 January 2026
Amount$13.4m
DeFi protocolsCode and bridge bugs

What happened

An arbitrary call in the contract of the SwapNet aggregator, integrated into Matcha, allows the approvals of users who had turned off one-time approvals to be spent. About $13.4 million.

The control that stops it

One-time approvals by default and periodic revocation of open approvals.

Networks: Base and EthereumDate: 25 January 2026
KITE Foundation5 August 2026
Amount$13.34m
Wallets and individualsPeople, access and keysReported with reservation

What happened

According to DeFiLlama 16 wallets drained at once for about $13.3 million through compromised keys. The foundation states it detected and contained the attack, suspended transfers on Ethereum and froze the tokens with no loss. Sources disagree: the figure is reported with reservation.

The control that stops it

Monitoring of anomalous transfers with automatic blocking, which worked here.

Networks: EthereumDate: 5 August 2026
Verus-Ethereum Bridge (May)17 May 2026
Amount$11.5m
Bridges and chainsCode and bridge bugs

What happened

A forged cross-chain payload passes the cryptographic checks but not the amount reconciliation, which is missing: the bridge pays out $11.5 million that was never deposited.

The control that stops it

Reconciliation of amounts between the two chains before every release.

Networks: Verus and EthereumDate: 17 May 2026
THORChain15 May 2026
Amount$10.7m
Bridges and chainsCode and bridge bugs

What happened

A newly added malicious node exploits a flaw in the threshold signing protocol (GG20) and reconstructs a vault key: $10.7 million withdrawn, network halted for five weeks.

The control that stops it

Vetting of incoming nodes, value limits per vault, alerts on out-of-quorum signatures.

Networks: Bitcoin, Ethereum, Base and BSCDate: 15 May 2026
YieldBlox / Blend V222 February 2026
Amountover $10m
DeFi protocolsOracles and prices

What happened

A thin market on the Stellar DEX is pumped with a single trade and the oracle reflects the inflated price: the collateral is worth ten times more and the lending pool is drained for over $10 million.

The control that stops it

Time-averaged oracles and filters on the minimum liquidity of the reference market.

Networks: StellarDate: 22 February 2026
Wanchain (Cardano bridge)21 July 2026
Amount$10m
Bridges and chainsCode and bridge bugs

What happened

Unseparated signature fields allow one valid signature to authorise a much larger redemption: 515 million NIGHT, about $10 million, leave the bridge to Cardano.

The control that stops it

Signing of every field of the message and per-block limits on redemptions.

Networks: CardanoDate: 21 July 2026
Syscoin Bridge7 June 2026
Amount$10m
Bridges and chainsCode and bridge bugs

What happened

A mismatch between Syscoin Core and the NEVM relay lets a malformed burn proof be accepted: about 5 billion SYS minted without backing, worth about $10 million.

The control that stops it

Proof verification on both layers and limits on bridge issuance.

Networks: SyscoinDate: 7 June 2026
KiiChain22 August 2026
Amount$9.7m
Bridges and chainsCode and bridge bugs

What happened

Balance-accounting defects in the shared Cosmos EVM module allow other users’ tokens to be redirected: $9.7 million. Same family of bugs as Nesa and TAC, in the same week.

The control that stops it

Coordinated upgrade of shared modules and tests on arithmetic edge cases.

Networks: KiiChain (Cosmos EVM)Date: 22 August 2026
Triple-A24 July 2026
Amount$9.7m
Exchanges and custodiansPeople, access and keys

What happened

The hot wallets of the crypto payments provider are drained across several chains for about $9.7 million; the loss is revised upwards in the following days.

The control that stops it

Balance caps on hot wallets and multi-approval signing above thresholds.

Networks: Ethereum, TRON, Arbitrum and other networksDate: 24 July 2026
Bonzo Lend11 July 2026
Amount$9.05m
DeFi protocolsOracles and prices

What happened

A tiny collateral deposit and a fabricated oracle price are enough to borrow about $9 million from Hedera’s largest lending protocol, which loses 77% of its deposited value.

The control that stops it

Redundant oracles and borrow limits on new markets.

Networks: HederaDate: 11 July 2026
Moonwell27 August 2026
Amount$8.7m
DeFi protocolsOracles and prices

What happened

The spot price of MAMO is pushed from $0.01 to $0.43: the inflated collateral allows undercollateralised borrowing of $8.7 million. The protocol’s third incident in eleven months.

The control that stops it

Time-averaged oracles and borrow caps on thinly traded tokens.

Networks: BaseDate: 27 August 2026
Term Finance23 August 2026
Amount$8.5m
DeFi protocolsGovernance

What happened

A malicious governance proposal takes control of the strategy vaults and moves their funds: about $8.5 million. The vaults were audited, the governance was not.

The control that stops it

Timelock and veto on proposals that touch vault funds.

Networks: EthereumDate: 23 August 2026
Crypto DAO28 July 2026
Amount$8.2m
DeFi protocolsCode and bridge bugs

What happened

An unprotected exec() function lets anyone transfer the vault’s USDT: $8.2 million in a single transaction.

The control that stops it

Access control on every function that moves funds, verified in audit.

Networks: BNB ChainDate: 28 July 2026
Coinsbuy9 August 2026
Amount$7.9m
Exchanges and custodiansPeople, access and keys

What happened

The wallets of the custody and payments service are drained on Ethereum and TRON for about $7.9 million, with fast conversion into Monero.

The control that stops it

Hot wallets with minimal balances and alerts on out-of-hours outflows.

Networks: Ethereum and TRONDate: 9 August 2026
Verus-Ethereum Bridge (July)22 July 2026
Amount$7.54m
Bridges and chainsCode and bridge bugsAdded by Crypfy

What happened

Sixty-six days after the first attack, the same flaw is exploited again for $7.5 million: the bridge’s total losses exceed $19 million.

The control that stops it

After an incident the bridge stays halted until the flaw is closed and verified by third parties.

Networks: Verus and EthereumDate: 22 July 2026
TAC22 August 2026
Amount$7.5m
Bridges and chainsCode and bridge bugs

What happened

Flaw in the Cosmos EVM module precompile: unauthorised transfer of TAC tokens worth $7.5 million. Network halted and supply migrated to a new issuance to strand the attacker.

The control that stops it

Precompile testing and a network halt plan that is ready and rehearsed.

Networks: TAC (Cosmos EVM)Date: 22 August 2026
DxSale28 May 2026
Amount$7.3m
DeFi protocolsPeople, access and keys

What happened

An unprotected owner key in a 2021 liquidity locker contract allows over 1,400 pools to be drained: $7.3 million, with suspicions of insider access.

The control that stops it

Renounced ownership or a multisig on legacy contracts that hold funds.

Networks: BNB ChainDate: 28 May 2026
Duelbits24 September 2026
Amount$7m
Exchanges and custodiansPeople, access and keys

What happened

Unauthorised transfers from the crypto casino’s hot wallets on four chains for about $7 million, suspected key compromise. Platform taken offline.

The control that stops it

Hot wallet keys in HSM or MPC with policies and daily withdrawal limits.

Networks: Ethereum, BSC, Bitcoin and TRONDate: 24 September 2026
Saga (SagaEVM)21 January 2026
Amount$7m
Bridges and chainsCode and bridge bugs

What happened

A helper contract abuses IBC messages and mints $7 million of the D stablecoin out of thin air: chain paused, stablecoin off peg.

The control that stops it

Validation of cross-chain messages and per-block issuance limits.

Networks: SagaDate: 21 January 2026
TrustedVolumes (1inch resolver)7 May 2026
Amount$6.7m
DeFi protocolsCode and bridge bugsAdded by Crypfy

What happened

A missing access control allows orders to be forged against the market maker that settles swaps on 1inch Fusion: $6.7 million in 85 transactions.

The control that stops it

Access controls and per-counterparty limits on settlement contracts.

Networks: EthereumDate: 7 May 2026
Summer.fi (Lazy Summer Protocol)5 July 2026
Amount$6m
DeFi protocolsCode and bridge bugsAdded by Crypfy

What happened

An impaired vault stays in the net asset value calculation: with a donation and a flash loan the attacker inflates the share price and redeems about $6 million. The protocol’s interface shuts down.

The control that stops it

Automatic exclusion of impaired assets from the net asset value and limits on redemptions.

Networks: EthereumDate: 5 July 2026
Polymarket (two frontend attacks)25 June and 29 October 2026
Amount$5.73m
DeFi protocolsPeople, access and keys

What happened

Two attacks on the site’s supply chain: in June a modified third-party script tricks users into signing approvals and $3 million in PUSD disappears; in October a monitoring vendor’s script is hijacked via DNS and takes about $2.7 million in POL. Polymarket refunds users.

The control that stops it

Third-party scripts loaded only with verified integrity and wallet-side simulation of approvals.

Networks: PolygonDate: 25 June and 29 October 2026
Wasabi Protocol30 April 2026
Amountover $5m
DeFi protocolsPeople, access and keysAdded by Crypfy

What happened

The deployer key is compromised and used as admin on several chains: over $5 million drained from the perp DEX, funds passed through Tornado Cash.

The control that stops it

Deploy keys separated from administration and handed to a multisig after launch.

Networks: Ethereum, Base, Berachain and BlastDate: 30 April 2026
Gravity Bridge30 May 2026
Amount$5.4m
Bridges and chainsPeople, access and keysAdded by Crypfy

What happened

A compromised validator signing key allows unauthorised withdrawals from the Ethereum to Cosmos bridge for $5.4 million. Bridge halted.

The control that stops it

Validator keys in HSMs and higher thresholds for releases.

Networks: Ethereum and CosmosDate: 30 May 2026

Where it breaks

By value, people, access and keys. By count, almost level with bugs.

Each case is classified by the entry point stated in the announcements or technical reports. People, access and keys account for 87% of the value with Binance and 55% without. Code and bridge bugs are 19 cases out of 47, but worth less than one eighth of the total.

Share of value

People, access and keys87%
Code and bridge bugs12%
Governance0%
Oracles and prices0%

Number of cases

People, access and keys: 23Code and bridge bugs: 19Governance: 2Oracles and prices: 3

By type of victim

Exchanges and custodians77%
DeFi protocols12%
Wallets and individuals6%
Bridges and chains5%

Number of cases

Exchanges and custodians: 8DeFi protocols: 24Wallets and individuals: 4Bridges and chains: 11

The message for whoever runs custody or payments: the vulnerability is not in the cryptography. It is in the sum of social engineering and single accesses that can reach signing on their own.

The five largest

Five cases, five different roads to the signature.

Two exchanges, a Bitcoin sidechain, a bridge and a protocol on Solana. In three cases out of five no key was stolen: the system signed.

29 October 2026

Binance

Compromised access, no key stolen.

$6.3bngone in one evening
36 hoursof signals visible on-chain
3 min 24 sfrom signature to empty wallet
$2.85bnfrozen or intercepted

The attack starts with a fake job interview and an altered package downloaded while looking for an AI coding tool. With an internal AI tool the attackers move to other engineers’ PCs and find a deploy token; a container launched with that token reaches the internal signing service, which signs 50 EIP-7702 delegations. Suspending withdrawals did not stop the on-chain delegation: the blockchain does not know the platform’s control panel. Binance replenished 98% from its own funds. A bank could not: a loss like this has to be prevented.

The control that stops itA signing system that never signs delegations, expiring critical access, simulation before signing.
Sources →

24 September 2026

Bitget

Forged commands, written before the checks.

$388mfrom 12 hot and warm addresses
24 daysof presence before the theft
34 minutesfrom first transfer to reconciliation
$1.1mfrozen

A zero-day flaw in a third-party security product opens the way to the internal systems; stolen high-privilege credentials make the attacker a valid identity all the way to the wallet servers. Two test transfers below the threshold trigger nothing. Real-time reconciliation sees the anomaly after 34 minutes and blocks user withdrawals, but the forged commands are not user withdrawals: the last large transfers are at 20:09. The risk check belongs at the signing layer, not only in the application.

The control that stops itRisk check at the signing layer, balance caps on hot wallets, reconciliation that also blocks internal transfers.
Sources →

6 September 2026

Liquid Network

A software bug, real bitcoin going out.

4,000 BTCredeemed from the reserves
3,400 BTCreturned after the patch
600 BTCransom refused
1:1L-BTC backing restored

A vulnerability in the Elements software, in how nodes cache range proof verifications, allows unbacked L-BTC to be created and redeemed for real bitcoin from the federation’s reserves. The largest theft of 2026 until September. After the patch the attackers return 85% of the funds; Blockstream refuses the ransom asked for the rest and restores the backing. The lesson: even with open-source code, peg-outs need limits and backing needs continuous monitoring.

The control that stops itReal-time monitoring of reserve backing and per-block limits on peg-outs.
Sources →

18 April 2026

Kelp DAO (rsETH)

A message that never existed, accepted by the bridge.

$291mof unbacked rsETH
20+chains involved
46 minutesbefore the contracts were frozen
RPCnodes compromised, according to LayerZero

The bridge validates an rsETH transfer that never left: according to the LayerZero report the attackers compromised the RPC nodes used by the verification path and injected fake cross-chain messages. The unbacked tokens end up as collateral in lending markets (Aave included) and the hole spreads to more than twenty chains. The largest DeFi theft of 2026 and a textbook case for the independent verification of cross-chain messages.

The control that stops itIndependent verification of cross-chain messages with several verifiers and caps on bridge volumes.
Sources →

1 April 2026

Drift Protocol

Signatures obtained by deception, valid until someone sends them.

$285min 31 withdrawals
12 minutesfrom first to last withdrawal
2 of 5multisig threshold
5 daysearlier: timelock removed

No code bug. The Security Council was a 2-of-5 multisig: two approvals obtained by deception and pre-signed with durable nonces, transactions that stay valid until someone sends them. Nonces created on 23 March, timelock removed on the 27th, on 1 April the pre-signed transactions hand over the admin permissions: a fake token accepted as collateral, limits raised, vaults drained. No 1:1 refund, but recovery tokens redeemable as a fund grows.

The control that stops itTimelock on every permission change, a threshold higher than 2 of 5, monitoring of nonces and pre-signed transactions.
Sources →

The patterns that repeat

Six patterns, six controls. They apply to exchanges and to banks alike.

The same patterns return throughout 2026. Each has a control that has been known for years.

Social engineering on people with access

Binance (fake interview and malware on a development PC), Drift (deceived signers), Step Finance (executive devices), a single investor ($282 million through fake support). The way in is people, not cryptography.

BinanceDriftStep FinancePrivate investor
The controlSocial engineering drills for teams with critical access, outside code only in a sandbox, out-of-band verification.

A single key with too much power

Resolv (service key in the cloud), Ostium (oracle key), AFX (5 validators out of 7), Humanity, 79th Vault, Wasabi, DxSale, Gravity Bridge: one compromised key is enough to drain everything.

ResolvOstiumAFX TradeHumanityWasabi
The controlLeast privilege, multisig with timelock on every function that moves funds, keys in HSM or MPC with policies.

Suppliers, hardware and frontends

Bitget (zero-day in a third-party product), Ledger (reseller with tampered devices), Coldcard (firmware), Polymarket (third-party scripts), SwapNet (integrated contract): the perimeter is wider than the org chart.

BitgetLedgerColdcardPolymarketSwapNet
The controlSuppliers inside the perimeter, verified integrity of scripts and devices, every third-party access logged and expiring.

Old code and bridges

Truebit and DxSale (2021 contracts still holding funds), Verus (the same flaw exploited twice in 66 days), Liquid, Kelp, Syscoin, Wanchain, THORChain, the Cosmos EVM module shared by Nesa, KiiChain and TAC.

TruebitVerusLiquidKelp DAOCosmos EVM
The controlRetirement of legacy contracts, independent verification of cross-chain messages, bridge halted until the flaw is closed.

Oracles and governance taken literally

YieldBlox, Bonzo and Moonwell (an inflated price in a thin market), BonkDAO and Term Finance (a proposal passed with bought votes): no bug, the system did what was written.

YieldBloxBonzoMoonwellBonkDAOTerm Finance
The controlTime-averaged oracles with liquidity filters; quorum, timelock and veto on proposals that touch funds.

Freezing only counts in the first hours

Binance $2.85 billion out of 6.3 thanks to blocks within minutes; Liquid 3,400 BTC out of 4,000 returned after the patch; Tectonic $111 million out of 120 erased by rolling the chain back; Bitget $1.1 million out of 388. Afterwards, the funds go dark.

BinanceLiquidTectonicBitget
The controlBlock request to exchanges and issuers in the first hours, with the destination already identified.

What we do

Before signing, inside the bank’s anti-fraud engine.

Crypfy is blockchain intelligence for the anti-fraud of banks and financial institutions. The signals enter via API into the anti-fraud engine already in use and the suspicious payment stops before it leaves. Anti-fraud, not just AML. As presented at the CERTFin webinar of 16 September 2026: Web2 fraud and crypto are one domain, stablecoins can be frozen only if you act within about 48 hours and with AI, attacks that used to be not worth it now hit smaller institutions too.

Transaction Simulation

Every custody transaction is simulated before signing, smart contract calls and delegations included. The outcome arrives in real time with its reasons: allow, review or block. The simulation reads the real effect of the transaction (destination, assets that move, permissions granted) regardless of what the interface shows.

In the Binance case the system signed 50 delegations and transfers to addresses born seconds earlier with no check at all.
In the Drift case two pre-signed transactions handed over the admin permissions: the simulation reads the effect, not the description.

Risk scoring on transactions

A 0 to 100 score on the destination wallet, with reason codes, on deposits and withdrawals: wallets with no history, links to illicit clusters, mixers, bridges, draining patterns. Integrated via API into the bank’s anti-fraud engine, so the rule fires on the payment and not on a report the day after.

In the Binance and Bitget cases funds left for addresses created seconds earlier: a wallet with no history is a signal read at withdrawal.
In the Coinsbuy and Grinex cases immediate conversion into Monero or assets that cannot be frozen: the draining pattern is recognisable in the first transactions.
Customers’ crypto exposureA registry of crypto operators with the IBANs and vIBANs of exchanges: the bank sees which transfers go to crypto and applies the anti-fraud rules before they leave, not after.
Web3 brand protectionSurveillance of Web3 names (ENS, .sol, .bnb) registered by third parties with the bank’s brand as a crypto payment address: 19 of 30 Italian institutions already have their brand in third-party hands (Crypfy analysis for the CERTFin 2026 webinar). Reports comparable week on week.
Destination check and Recovery DeskIn the first 48 hours: identify the destination, prepare and send the block request to exchanges and issuers in time. For crypto there is no recall, there is a block requested in time.

How we work

Via APIinside the anti-fraud already in the bank
Console and audit reportsevery outcome with its reasons, readable by anti-fraud and compliance
Team and support in Italythe people who built the product answer

Talk to us.

We show you the cases on this page as read by our tools, then your perimeter. A first step with no integration: with an anonymised sample of your transfers we measure how much of the flow goes to crypto operators.

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How it was made

Sources and method

The list starts from the public rankings of 2026 thefts and from the DeFiLlama Hacks database. Each case was then verified against at least one primary source (platform statement or technical report) or against a trade publication and a security firm. Sources are linked case by case.

Amounts are in dollars at the time of the theft, rounded. Where sources differ, the range or the best documented estimate is shown. Cases above $5 million are included; cases with no verifiable source are excluded. A case where sources contradict each other is flagged. Cases not in the starting rankings and added by Crypfy are marked. The Aave swap of 12 March ($50.4 million in aEthUSDT turned into about $36,000 of AAVE) is not in the list: CoinDesk and FXStreet describe it as a swap with slippage above 99%, not a theft.

The categories are a Crypfy classification by the stated entry point: people, access and keys; code and bridge bugs; oracles and prices; governance. No third-party attribution: this page does not say who did it, it says what would have slowed the attack down.

Page updated on 6 November 2026. It will be updated as the official reports still pending are published.